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At the end of 1890’s, the situation of China was bad. Foreign powers
took advantage from China’s weakness, seized various ports in China
and declared entire provinces their “spheres of influence”.1 The coun-
try was tormented by natural catastrophes and general unrest. At the
Imperial court in Beijing a bitter struggle between reformists and reac-
tionaries took place, and the latter party prevailed. The Guangxu Em-
peror was arrested by the Empress Dowager Cixi,2 who became regent
and ruled in his name. The victorious reactionary clique, represented
by Manchu aristocrats and led by Prince Duan (1856–1922), was hos-
tile to foreign influence. On 24 January 1900, Prince Duan reached his
long-term goal and secured appointment of his son Pujun (1886–1929)
heir apparent.
1 This study is one of the outcomes of the grant “The Political and Economic Inter-
ests of Great Britain and Germany in China in 1894–1914”, awarded by the Grant
Agency of the Czech Republic (GA13–12431S).
2 In fact, Cixi (1835–1908) was neither an Empress nor a dowager. She was a con-
cubine of Emperor Xianfeng (ruled 1850–1861) and mother of his only son and
successor, Emperor Tongzhi (ruled 1861–1875). Even after Tongzhi’s death she
maintained her power and secured the succession of the Guangxu Emperor.
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German interests in China were significant. In 1899, there were 115
German companies and 1,134 Germans present in China, out of total
933 foreign firms and 17,193 foreigners settled in theMiddle Kingdom.3
The core of German interests in China lay in the province of Shandong.
Since late 1897 the Germans occupied the Jiaozhou Bay and built a new
port Qingdao which became their naval base; they turned the province
into their sphere of influence; and exerted on China excessive economic
rights, which they ruthlessly started to exploit. At the outbreak of the
Boxer crisis, German interests were protected by the 3rd Battalion of
marine infantry, based in Qingdao and led by Major Johannes Christ.
German cruiser squadron in Far Eastern waters was commanded by
Vice Admiral Felix von Bendemann. Since May 12, 1899, Germany was
represented in China by Clemens von Ketteler. He was not liked by
his colleagues. Unlike some of them, von Ketteler was not only a pro-
fessional diplomat, but he was experienced in Chinese matters as well.
In fact, “he considered himself the only China expert among the otherwise
inexperienced crowd”.4 In 1880’s, Ketteler had acted as a translator at
German consulates in China and as a chargé d’affaires in Beijing. Later
he became German minister to the United States (1892–1896) and Mex-
ico (1896–1899). Despite such a background, Ketteler’s mission to the
Chinese court ended in a tragedy.
The province of Shandong was of the most stricken parts of China.
Increasing German activities in Shandong only intensified the unrest
among its inhabitants and preoccupied provincial officials, who failed
to solve other problems. In such a milieu of unrest and despair, a dan-
gerous secret society emerged. In the West, its members are known
as “Boxers”. The origins and the affiliations of the movement are a
matter of controversy. The movement originally called itself Yihequan,
or “Righteous and Harmonious Fists”, hence the nickname “Boxers”.
Sometimes in 1898 or in 1899 it changed the name to Yihetuan, or “Righ-
3 H.B. MORSE, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire. Vol. II, The Period of
Submission, 1861–1893, London – Bombay – Calcutta 1918, footnote 172 on p. 326.
4 L. XIANG, The Origins of the Boxer War. AMultinational Study, London – New York
2003, p. 134.
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teous and Harmonious Militia”. The Boxers were practising magical
rites, suppressing banditry, harassing local Christians, and chanting
“Support the Qing, destroy the foreigner”. It is hard to determine the sin-
cerity of such statements. But the Yihetuan movement as such wasn’t
openly anti-Manchu.
Since early spring 1899, Shandong was administered by a conser-
vative Manchu named Yuxian. The governor failed to suppress the
“Boxer” movement, and he certainly felt sympathy towards their man-
ifested goal of wiping out the foreigners. Using a sugar-and-a-whip
policy, Yuxian suppressed some of less trustworthy “Boxer” leaders
and protected the rest of the Yihetuan movement from his own zealous
subordinates. Encouraged by the ambivalent attitude of the author-
ities towards the movement, the “Boxer” movement gained strength
and started causing much havoc.
Foreign diplomats5 didn’t fail to notice Yuxian’s malign influence.
On 6 December 1899, due to their pressure, Yuxian was recalled to Bei-
jing “on consultations”. He was replaced by an extremely able young
general Yuan Shikai, who was of Han Chinese origin. “The first thing
Yuan did was to test the Boxers invulnerability.” The “Boxers” naturally
failed Yuan’s test. The restoration of order in Shandong didn’t take part
immediately. On December 31, 1899, only after Yuan’s arrival to the
province, British missionary Brooks was slain. But Yuan tried to sup-
press the Yihetuan movement mercilessly. His efforts were somewhat
hindered by the central government which was meanwhile consulting
the matter with Yuxian.6 In middle March 1900, the court seemingly
finally “solved” the problem of Yuxian: the Manchu dignitary was ap-
pointed governor of Shanxi,7 whereas Yuan Shikai became regular gov-
ernor of Shandong.
5 In 1900, there were eleven countries represented in Beijing: Germany, Austria-
Hungary, the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, France, Italy, the United States,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain.
6 XIANG, pp. 117–119 and 143.
7 L.K. YOUNG, British Policy in China, 1895–1902, Oxford 1970, p. 115.
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The unrest in Shandong was directly affecting German activities
in the province, especially those of the Shandong Railway Company
(SEG; Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft). Since September 1899, the
company was constructing a railroad track from Qingdao to the pro-
vincial capital of Jinan. The construction of the railway greatly up-
set Chinese people along the proposed track. At the turn of the years
1899–1900, the turmoil in the province reached such a degree that the
construction had to be stopped until February 1900.8 Still, the bulk of
“Boxer” forces moved from Shandong to the neighbouring province
of Zhili. Zhili was not an ordinary province; it was a centre of the
Sinocentric world, for it surrounded the Chinese capital of Beijing with
its xenophobic court. Moreover, the most important Western targets in
northern China were located there: foreign entrepreneurs in the great
port of Tianjin, and numerous foreign establishments and legations in
the diplomatic quarter in Beijing.
It is not easy to date the exact beginning of the Boxer Uprising; and
it is certain that the very term “Boxer Uprising” is incorrect. Its mem-
bers didn’t call themselves “Boxers”, and they didn’t rebel against the
central government; in fact, they manifested their support of it. Chi-
nese court was at this time extraordinarily indecisive, as far as the
“Boxer” movement was concerned. Manchu reactionaries naturally
didn’t trust any Chinese heterodox sect, but the “Boxers” were profess-
ing loyalty to the dynasty. The court feared that the alreadywidespread
Yihetuan movement, if persecuted, would turn against the Manchus.9
Aswas already shown in Shandong in 1898–1899, the court didn’t have
enough reliable troops to maintain order at the country and defend the
area against the possibility of foreign attack. The defence of Beijing
8 C. WENDELS, Die Schantung Eisenbahn. Das Interesse der Finanzwelt an der
deutschen Bahnlinie in Ostchina, Siegburg 2012, pp. 45–46.
9 On May 27, Sir Robert Hart, Inspector-General of the Chinese Imperial Maritime
Customs Service, observed: “The Court appears to be in a dilemma: if the Boxers are not
suppressed, the Legations threaten to take action – if the attempt to suppress them is made,
this intensely patriotic organization will be converted into an anti-dynastic movement!”
XIANG, p. 222.
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was the priority, so the order at the countryside was insufficiently pro-
tected. Violent attacks on foreign and Christian targets followed, which
inevitably further enraged the foreigners.10
During the first few months of 1900, the disturbances grew to an
unprecedented scale, and at the end of May most foreigners started
to feel extremely threatened. At the end of May, German minister re-
ported that “A seditious trash of Boxers, 4,000 to 5,000 men strong, perme-
ated to the immediate vicinity of Peking, occupied the railroads from Tientsin
to Peking and from Paotingfu to Peking, some 30 km far from here, expelled
foreign employees and wounded some of them, and burned the stations.”11
Even though some governmental troops were fighting the “Boxers”,
the foreigners didn’t trust their commitment. The deteriorating situa-
tion led to a series of conferences of foreign diplomats in Beijing and,
eventually to a sort of embarrassment for Ketteler himself. The first
meeting of 20 May 1900 has been summoned by French Minister Pi-
chon, who was strongly in favour of calling for legation guards.12 At
that meeting Ketteler expressed his doubt about the effectiveness of a
presence of marine detachments13 and recommended concentration of
foreign warships off Shanhaiguan.14
Other meetings of the same nature would follow. On 26 May the
ministers asked the Zongli Yamen15 for permission to summon troops
for protection of the legations, but the permission was denied.16 In-
stead, the Chinese court deployed some policemen in the legation
10 J.W. ESHERICK, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising, Berkeley – Los Angeles – Lon-
don 1987, pp. 284–286.
11 Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914 (further only GP). J. LEP-
SIUS – A.MENDELSOHN-BARTHOLDY – F. THIMME (Hrsg.), Berlin 1922–1927,
Bd. XVI, Berlin 1924, Nr. 4511, pp. 3–4, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 29. 5. 1900.
12 MORSE, pp. 194–195.
13 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4513, pp. 5–6, Ketteler an Bülow, 2. 6. 1900.
14 MORSE, p. 195.
15 The Zongli Yamenwas created in 1861 in order to manage dealings with foreigners.
16 H. KEOWN-BOYD, The Fists of Righteous Harmony. A History of the Boxer Uprising
in China in the Year 1900, London 1991, p. 48.
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quarter.17 The day earlier, on 25 May, Ketteler received a telegram
from State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Bernhard von Bülow.18 He
was instructed not to take part on collective actions of the diplomatic
corps, using an alleged lack of instructions as a pretext. At the same
time, he was expected to explain to the Chinese discreetly that Ger-
many was strong enough to obtain compensation for any losses single-
handedly and independently on other powers.19 Yet at the meeting
of 28 May he paraphrased the second part of this message to his col-
leagues. Other diplomats considered it a hint of German intention to
divide China, consulted the matter with their superiors, and finally
even Bülow learnt about the matter. On 31 May 1900 he asked Ket-
teler for an explanation,20 which he found unsatisfactory and repri-
manded the German representative. At the end of his telegram, Bülow
expressed his disappointment by minister’s conduct by these words:
“Not any truth must be necessarily told.”21 Such an “advice” was hardly
welcomed by a 47-years old high-ranking diplomat. These rumours
surely worsened the image of Germany and especially of Ketteler in
Chinese eyes. The Chinese court suspected the foreigners from prepar-
ing an aggression, and the foreigners gradually started to suspect the
court from hostile intentions. But it may be assumed that neither side
really wished a conflict. After a series of misunderstandings and hasty
decisions, both sides of the dispute found themselves on a sloped plane
leading to the catastrophe of 1900.
Despite Chinese refusal, foreign diplomats in Beijing asked their
governments for detachments, and German Minister to China was not
an exception. On 28 May 1900, he asked Berlin for detachment of 50
troops from Qingdao.22 On 31 May, the Zongli Yamen succumbed to
repeated request of the diplomatic corps and permitted the envoys
17 XIANG, p. 215.
18 On 17 October 1900 Bülow became German Chancellor.
19 GP, Bd. XVI, footnote yy on p. 5.
20 Ibidem, Nr. 4512, pp. 4–5, Bülow an Ketteler, 31. 5. 1900.
21 Ibidem, Nr. 4514, p. 6, Bülow an Ketteler, 5. 6. 1900.
22 Ibidem, Nr. 4511, pp. 3–4, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 29. 5. 1900.
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to summon no more than 30 troops for each legation. The foreigners
failed to fulfil this condition.23 The majority of foreign detachments en-
tered Beijing at the end of May. Their German and Austro-Hungarian
colleagues were the last to arrive; together they entered Chinese capi-
tal on June 3, 1900. German detachment consisted of 50 sailors led by
1 officer, Count Alfred von Soden.24 In Beijing, there were about 451–
458 legation guards altogether.25 Together with armed volunteers of
foreign origin, the overall strength of the foreigners in Beijing didn’t
exceed 530 to 550 men. Which were the prospects of such a force, and
how powerful were its foes?
Even though the total number of Chinese soldiers was, at least on
paper, enormous – one estimate gave the number of 1,752,00026 –, the
actual strength of Chinese army was rather low. Many units had only
a small friction of their alleged strength, and most of them had insuf-
ficient training and antiquated weaponry. But despite the fact that the
Manchu court had suppressed the reform movement in 1898, it defi-
nitely didn’t hesitate to continue reforming the Chinese army. Between
1898 and 1899, the overall shipment of war material to Tianjin, Fuzhou,
Hankou, and Canton increased more than threefold.27 Even the spread
of anti-foreign disturbances in northern China in early 1900 didn’t per-
suade the foreigners – and especially the Germans – to stop import-
ing weapons to China. For example in mid-June 1900 the foreigners
in Tianjin appropriated 50 Mauser rifles and 30,000 rounds of ammuni-
tion, which had been ordered by the Chinese, and handed them over to
civilian defenders.28 After the fall of Beijing the foreigners discovered
23 MORSE, p. 198.
24 GP, Bd. XVI, footnote  on p. 4.
25 Legations of all countries with the exception of the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Spain were protected by their own guards. Allegedly to Morse, there were
82 British, 81 Russians, 79 French, 56 Americans, 51 Germans, 41 Italians, 35
Austro-Hungarians, and 25 Japanese. MORSE, p. 280.
26 R. POWELL, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895–1912, Princeton 1955, p. 107.
27 Ibidem, pp. 108–109.
28 C.C. DIX, TheWorld’s Navies in the Boxer Rebellion (China 1900), London 1905, p. 52.
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a hidden depot containing no less than 100 hitherto unused Krupp’s
cannons and immense numbers of other weapons and ammunition of
foreign origin.29
The great powers had already sent legation guards to Beijing in
1894–1895 and 1898–1899. Yet, the new arrival of foreign detachments
to Beijing humiliated and scared both the Imperial court and the peo-
ple. It is possible that the Chinese overestimated the real number of
foreign troops in Beijing: on 13 June the court forbade any further
strengthening of foreign detachments in Beijing, stating that there al-
ready were more than thousand legation guards altogether.30 A mere
presence of foreign troops in the vicinity of the Forbidden City was
undoubtedly upsetting the Imperial court. Increasing presence of for-
eign warships off Dagu only increased this perception of threat.31 The
Chinese were aware of relatively recent disturbances in Korea, during
which Japanese troops repeatedly (1884 and 1894) took possession of
Korean monarch in order to force him to collaborate.32
Chinese court was protected better than the Korean one. The Guard
Army, the most formidable force in northern China, was led by Man-
chu Generalissimo Ronglu, who was on best terms with the Empress
Dowager. His army consisted of five “armies”, or divisions: The Cen-
tral Army was led by Ronglu himself. The Front Army or “Tenacious
Army” of General Nie Shicheng was well armed by Mauser rifles, ar-
tillery, and even machine guns. The Left Army (or the Resolute Army)
of General Song Qing was similarly equipped. The Rear Army of Gen-
eral Dong Fuxiang was nicknamed the “Gansu Braves”, and was com-
posed primarily ofMuslims from the province of Gansu. Dong’s troops
were known for their ferocity. By far the best Chinese division was
29 T. v. WINTERHALDER, Kämpfe in China. Eine Darstellung der Wirren und der
Betheiligung von Österreich-Ungarns Seemacht an ihrer Niederwerfung in den Jahren
1900-1901, Wien – Budapest 1902, pp. 422–423.
30 YOUNG, p. 121.
31 XIANG, pp. 213–214.
32 Accordingly to French Minister Pichon, at the beginning of June, Ketteler indeed
suggested “marching on the Summer Palace”. KEOWN-BOYD, p. 58.
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Yuan Shikai’s “Newly Created Army”, or the Right Army. Yuan’s
forces followed their leader to Shandong.33 Aside from Ronglu’s guard
armies, there were also other forces in the vicinity of Beijing; the al-
ready antiquated Eight Banners consisting of descendants of Manchu,
Mongol, and Han Chinese soldiers who had conquered China in the
seventeenth century were the most notable of them. One division of
the Bannermen, the so-called “Tiger and Divine Corps”, was led by
Prince Duan himself. Accordingly to foreign estimates, some 110,000
to 140,000 Chinese soldiers were available for defence of Beijing.34
German policy in general was deeply influenced by the personal-
ity of German Emperor, whose power was less limited than power of
most of his fellow monarchs in other countries. Wilhelm II was a de-
vout Christian, who had a strong sense of superiority over the Asians.
He had long feared and perhaps at the same time looked forward for
the day when the “Yellow Peril” would came into being.35 He no-
ticed rising chaos in northern China, and at the very beginning he pre-
emptively suggested a brutal retaliation. “On 5 June, for example, Wil-
helm had demanded on the Auswärtiges Amt that the city ofWech-huan36 near
Kiaochow be bombarded and occupied ‘if anything happens to a German’.”37
Such a request was not unsubstantiated, even though Yuan Shikai
was already pacifying Shandong. In June 1900, the construction of
the Shandong railway was halted again, and German staff, as well as
33 The organization and strength of Ronglu’s Guard Army are analyzed by Jerome
Ch’en and Ralph Powell. POWELL, pp. 102–105; J. CH’EN, Yuan Shih-k’ai, 1859–
1916. Brutus Assumes the Purple, Stanford 1961, pp. 51–53.
34 POWELL, pp. 107–108.
35 “Bernhard von Bülow, then Foreign Secretary, later recorded in his memoirs that he had
‘never seen Kaiser Wilhelm [. . . ] in such excitement as during the first phase of the Chi-
nese confusion’. According to Bülow, Wilhelm stated repeatedly: ‘Now it is a joy to be
alive!’” A. MOMBAUER, Wilhelm, Waldersee, and the Boxer Rebellion, in: M.
MOMBAUER – W. DEIST (eds.), The Kaiser. New Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in
Imperial Germany, Cambridge 2004, p. 95.
36 It is difficult to find out the exact identity of this city.
37 MOMBAUER, footnote 13 on p. 95.
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Chinese Christians, had to flee to Qingdao.38 The measure proposed
by Wilhelm II would have undoubtedly embarrassed Yuan Shikai and
perhaps even dragged him into the conflict against his will. Similarly,
on 2 July the Germans suggested conquering fortifications of Qifu, an
important port on the coast of Shandong. They were enraged by fresh
news from Beijing, not by Yuan’s behaviour or by general conditions
in the German sphere of influence.39 Let’s say in advance that the sit-
uation in Shandong throughout the entire “Boxer Uprising” was rela-
tively good. One significant event was burning of an American Presby-
terian mission at Weixian.40 Thereafter Yuan Shikai stated that he was
not able to protect foreigners in the interior of Shandong,41 and the for-
eigners and Christians fled, especially to the German leased area, but
the unrest was manageable. It was even rumoured that the inhabitants
of the eastern part of the province were anti-Boxer; an American news-
paper reported that they had buried 50 “Boxers” alive.42 Still, Wilhelm
II didn’t trust any Chinese, not even Yuan Shikai and his army. On
18 July he explained his worries to Bülow. He was aware of growing
tensions between the British and the Russians. Furthermore he was
afraid of a possible uprising in Korea, with the possibility of Japanese
involvement. Such a turmoil would endanger Qingdao, and its safety
had even higher priority than an advance on Beijing. Wilhelm II there-
fore ordered to withdraw all German troops from Zhili to Qingdao.43
On 22 July Count Bülow sent to the Emperor a quite positive re-
port about the development in Shandong. Generally speaking, German
38 WENDELS, p. 46.
39 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4546, pp. 31–33. Bülow an das Auswärtige Amt, 3. 7. 1900.
The Germans were enraged that the news about Ketteler’s death was confirmed
(see below). Finally, the plan came to nought, because the commander of Ger-
man naval forces in the Far East, Vice Admiral Bendemann, didn’t have sufficient
forces.
40 Not to be confused with Weixian in Zhili, where some Catholic missionaries were
killed by the “Boxers”.
41 WINTERHALDER, p. 93.
42 The Boxer Rising. A History of the Boxer Trouble in China, Shanghai 1901, p. 41.
43 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4576, pp. 59–60, Kaiser Wilhelm II an Bülow, 18. 7. 1900.
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interests weren’t imperilled. Since 3 July the Governor of Qingdao
Captain Paul Jaeschke44 didn’t report any incidents, and both the per-
sonnel of SEG and the missionaries were safe. German leased area of
Jiaozhou was entirely peaceful, and the garrison, consisting of the 3rd
Battalion of marine infantry, was ready to undertake a punitive expedi-
tion into the hinterland of Shandong. Bülow opposed such a move, for
he was afraid of driving hitherto “neutral” Yuan Shikai into the camp
of the reactionary clique in Beijing. He also warned that, in case of
German territorial aggrandizement in Shandong, other powers would
follow German lead: Russia in northern China, Britain in the Yangtze
region. The latter move would seriously damage German trade.45 Af-
ter the end of the Boxer crisis, the Germans only hesitantly returned
to Shandong. The Shandong Railway Company resumed construction
works at the end of 1900 only, and the railroad was complete on 1 July
1904, i. e. in concordance with the schedule.46 To sum up, the events
in German sphere of influence in Shandong in 1900 had only a very
insignificant impact on the development of the “Boxer” crisis. In Zhili,
the situation was extremely different.
Since late May, the situation in Zhili was deteriorating day by day.
On June 4, large numbers of the Boxers started to demolish a railway
station and a bridge at Huangcun near Tianjin. When General Nie’s
troops tried to stop them by force, the Boxers prevailed, and the sol-
diers sustained 80 casualties.47 The German and Austro-Hungarian de-
tachment were quite lucky that they had already reached Beijing. On
6 June British Minister to China Sir Claude MacDonald asked for new
reinforcements, but, so far, in vain. Instead, another man departed for
Beijing: Li Bingheng, former Governor of Shandong, was summoned
to the court. He hated the foreigners and especially the Germans. Prior
to the German seizure of Jiaozhou, he had already been promised the
44 Paul Jaeschke (1851–1901) held the rank of Kapitän zur See, which is equal to
Colonel of ground forces.
45 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4582, pp. 63–65, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 22. 7. 1900.
46 WENDELS, pp. 46–47.
47 XIANG, pp. 220–221.
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viceroyalty of Sichuan. Due to German pressure, he was cashiered and
dismissed from public service instead;48 and now he was in favour of
the court again. On 8 June the foreigners asked the court for permis-
sion to call for additional detachments anew, unsuccessfully.49 In the
next few days, the tension between the foreigners and the Chinese, the
diplomats and the court, only rose. On 10 June Prince Duan was ap-
pointed head of the Zongli Yamen.50 Minister Ketteler asked the Chi-
nese to agree with German occupation of the Beijing railway station,
but in vain;51 instead, the Chinese prevented the foreigners from us-
ing a telegraph connection between Beijing and Tianjin. One of the
last transmissions was sent by Claude MacDonald to British Admiral
Seymour, the most senior among commanders of foreign forces at Tian-
jin and Dagu. MacDonald stated: “Situation extremely grave; unless ar-
rangements are made for immediate advance on Beijing it will be too late.”52
Admiral Seymour complied to this request and prepared an expedi-
tionary force, which was expected to reach Beijing by 11 June. On that
day, Seymour didn’t appear. Instead, chancellor of the Japanese lega-
tion Sugiyama Akira was killed by Dong Fuxiang’s soldiers, and the
Japanese’s body was mutilated.
48 MORSE, pp. 107–109; G. STEINMETZ, Qingdao as a Colony. From Apartheid
to Civilizational Exchange. Paper prepared for the Johns Hopkins Workshops
in Comparative History of Science and Technology, “Science, Technology and
Modernity: Colonial Cities in Asia, 1890–1940”, Baltimore, January 16–17, 2009,
p. 3, at: http://www-personal.umich.edu/geostein/docs/Qingdaocolony.pdf
[2015-10-11].
49 MORSE, p. 202.
50 However, the existing head of the office, Prince Qing, wasn’t dismissed.
51 WINTERHALDER, p. 188.
52 MORSE, p. 201. Edmund S. Wehrle explains MacDonald’s request by rivalry
among the great powers. Accordingly to him, British minister had been noticed
of advance of 1,700 Russian troops on Beijing. Therefore MacDonald decided to
prevent any unilateral strengthening of Russian influence by calling for primarily
British reinforcements, thus significantly escalated the situation. E. S. WEHRLE,
Britain, China, and the Antimissionary Riots, 1891–1900, Minneapolis 1966, pp. 170–
173.
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Shortly thereafter Minister Ketteler expressed his nature, brave and
brutal at the same time. On 12 or 13 June he encountered two Chinese,
presumably a father and a son. They were in the middle of the legation
quarter, clothed in Boxers’ attire; the elder Chinese was sharpening a
short sword and shouted “This is for all foreigners!” Unfortunately, Ket-
teler understood him, beat him by his walking stick, forced him to flee,
and took the younger Chinese prisoner. Later, top-ranking Chinese
officials including Zhongli, the commander of Beijing police, came to
Ketteler and asked him for release of the adolescent, but it didn’t hap-
pen. Either Ketteler refused to comply, or the captive had already been
shot during an attempt to escape.53
On 13 June, numerous bands of the “Boxers” entered Peking. The
opponents of the xenophobic cliquewere killed, looting took place, and
it was evident that armored clash was inevitable. Indeed, in the next
few days occurredmany incidents between legation guards on one side
and both the “Boxers” and governmental troops on the other. The for-
eigners definitely weren’t passive. For example on 15 June a group
composed primarily of Germans and British rushed into a church full
of Christians which were being slaughtered by the “Boxers”. The Eu-
ropeans killed the attackers and rescued the survivors into safety.54
On June 17, there was a clash between the “Boxers” and Dong Fuxi-
ang’s soldiers on one side, and German, Austro-Hungarian and British
guards on the other.55 At that time, Seymour’s troops were facing a
huge threat themselves.
53 WINTERHALDER, p. 192; MORSE, p. 204; KEOWN-BOYD, p. 58; M. LEUT-
NER, Die Belagerung der Gesandtschaften oder. Wie der Krieg begann, in: M.
LEUTNER – K. MÜHLHAHN (eds.), Kolonialkrieg in China. Die Niederschlagung
der Boxerbewegung 1900–1901, Berlin 2007, pp. 102–103. These authors vary in de-
tails. Rumours are that Ketteler himself shot the captive – Winterhalder explicitly
claims that the “Boxer” was killed on 22 June, i. e. two days after Ketteler’s death.
54 WINTERHALDER, p. 206.
55 G. SCHUSTA, Österreich-Ungarn und der Boxeraufstand. Dissertation, St. Pölten
1967, p. 78. H. B. Morse claims that on 17 June “a conflict occurred between a small
German guard and Chinese soldiers, in which five of the latter were killed”. MORSE,
p. 212.
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On June 10, Seymour left his ships, arrived to Tianjin, and pro-
ceeded to Beijing with the first part of the allied force. Other detach-
ments followed and reached him, and he had 2,129 to 2,156 troops at
his disposal.56 Next to the British, the Germans were the strongest part
of his force, totalling 512 to 552 men.57 The railroad track was dam-
aged by the “Boxers”, thus the expedition was delayed. Since 11 June
the foreigners were under “Boxers” attacks. On the next day, the ex-
pedition reached Langfang and couldn’t continue. Seymour decided
to safeguard his rear, and asked the French and the Germans to return
to the railway station at Yangcun. Commanders of both units refused,
fearing that the Briton just wanted to delay their arrival to Beijing.58 At
the beginning, Chinese governmental troops peacefully observed Sey-
mour’s advance, but on 18 June the situation changed, and since then
Seymour had to cope with repeated attacks of Chinese regular army.59
What had happened?
After Seymour’s departure, commanders of foreign naval forces lo-
cated in front of Dagu observed the situation in northern China. On
15 June, they organized a meeting presided over by Russian Admiral
Hildebrandt; Germany was represented by Vice Admiral Bendemann.
The commanders got the impression that the Chinese were about to
reinforce the forts at Dagu and lay mines in the Peiho River, thus iso-
lating not only Beijing and Tianjin but also Seymour’s force. In fact,
it was quite possible to reach Beijing by other means, but the com-
manders ignored this fact.60 Bendemann recommended sending a joint
56 The German force reached Seymour on 11 June. Accordingly to C.C. Dix, the
Viceroy of Zhili, Yulu, tried to stop them at Tianjin. DIX, pp. 23–24.
57 H.B. Morse claims that the number of Seymour’s troops was 2,066, including 540
Germans; yet the presented numbers of men in each contingent are equal to 2,156.
H. Keown-Boyd claims that Seymour led 2,129 men, 512 of them being German.
Rudolf Zabel states that no less than 25 German officers and 527 men participated
on the expedition. MORSE, p. 202; KEOWN-BOYD, p. 61; R. ZABEL, Deutschland
in China, Leipzig 1902, p. 134.
58 KEOWN-BOYD, p. 66.
59 MORSE, p. 214.
60 WEHRLE, p. 174.
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ultimatum to Chinese commander at Dagu, asking for surrendering
the forts. With the exception of American Admiral Kempff, the com-
manders supported such a move.61 Of course the Chinese didn’t ac-
cept this ultimatum and started shooting on foreign vessels instead.
As a result, a combined foreign force attacked and captured the forts
early in the morning of 17 June. Furthermore, the foreigners captured
four modern Chinese destroyers, built by German shipyards. Some 900
troops participated on the conquest of the fortresses; 130 of them were
German, and the landing force was led by German Captain Hugo von
Pohl. Moreover, German gunboat Iltis took part on the assault as well;
its captain Wilhelm Lans and many other members of its crew were
killed or wounded.62 The commanders at Dagu advocated their move
in amemorandumwhich was communicated tomoderate statesmen in
central and southern China through German consul at Qifu, who held
the position of doyen of the consular corps there.63
The court in Beijing was infuriated; units of Chinese regular army
started to turn against the foreigners.64 Under these circumstances
Seymour decided not to advance on Beijing, but he was unable to re-
turn to Tianjin by train, for the railroad in his rear was too much dam-
aged. As a result, the allied forces retreated on foot along the Peiho
River, repulsing constant Chinese attacks. Due to German initiative,
four river junks have been seized, facilitating the retreat. On 21 June,
Semour’s chief of staff, British Captain (later Admiral) John Jellicoe,
was seriously wounded, and his duties were transferred to German
commander, Captain von Usedom. On the same day, Seymour’s
army accidentally found a huge arsenal near the village of Xigu and
captured it at night, the British and the Germans executing the main
61 The text of the ultimatum is quoted in: WINTERHALDER, footnote on p. 66.
62 Ibidem, pp. 59–87; DIX, pp. 27–45; ZABEL, pp. 113–117; KEOWN-BOYD, pp.
77–80.
63 YOUNG, footnote 2 on p. 124. The text of the note is quoted by H. B. Morse.
MORSE, p. 227.
64 P.H. CLEMENTS, The Boxer Rebellion. A Political and Historical Review, New York
1915, p. 129.
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attack.65 Fatigued and shaken, Seymour’s corps entrenched itself in
the conquered arsenal, and on 25 June the relief force has been itself re-
lieved by a chiefly Russian troops.66 Seymour returned to Tianjin on 26
June, just in time to ward off sustained Chinese attacks on the foreign
quarter which had started after the conquest of the Dagu forts. Dur-
ing his retreat, Seymour coined a famous phrase: “The Germans to the
front!” During the course of Seymour’s expedition 12 German partici-
pants were killed and 62 wounded.67
The foreigners in Beijing weren’t informed about Seymour’s adven-
tures. At the same time, the outside world lost its last connection with
Beijing. On 17 June the Chinese interrupted even the telegraph con-
nection between Beijing and Russian city of Kiachta, and the foreigners
in Beijing were completely isolated.68 Inevitably, rumours of all sorts
started to alarm foreign governments and public alike.
Already on June 16, 1900 a telegram by the “Exchange Telegraph
Company” shocked the world. Accordingly to the telegram, all lega-
tions in Beijing had been destroyed and GermanMinister to China had
been killed. German consul at Qifu was ordered to find out more, and
on June 18 he reported that the Japanese confirmed the takeover of the
legations.69 This news reached German Emperor at Helgoland. En-
raged Wilhelm II immediately returned to Wilhelmshaven and wasted
no time. When he received a message about departure of 2,000 Japa-
nese troops to China, he noted that themarine infantry should bemobi-
lized and that the armoured cruiser Fürst Bismarck had already received
orders to prepare for an immediate voyage.70 Later that day he ordered
Admiral Tirpitz to mobilize the marine infantry, and he suggested a
65 KEOWN-BOYD, pp. 93–96; DIX, pp. 86–91.
66 Accordingly to C.C. Dix, Colonel Shirinsky’s force which relieved Seymour con-
sisted from 1,000 Russians, 600 British, and 300 German, Italian, and Japanese
troops, i. e. 1,900 men altogether. DIX, p. 115.
67 CLEMENTS, p. 134.
68 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4525, pp. 12–13, Kaiser Wilhelm II an Bülow, 18. 6. 1900.
69 Ibidem, footnote  on p. 12
70 Ibidem, Nr. 4524, p. 12, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 18. 6. 1900.
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mobilization of “a Prussian infantry division or an [army] corps”.71 He
consulted the situation with Count Metternich, a member of his en-
tourage, and enjoyed the idea of closer cooperation between Germany
and Russia.72
On June 18, Wilhelm II had his doubts about the credibility of the
news from China and about the role of the Empress Dowager Cixi.73
On the next day, he was in a different state of mind. He sent to Count
Bülow a telegram of the most bloodthirsty sort, comparable only to his
famous “Hun Speech”: “A grand military action of a collective na-
ture must be organized immediately [. . . ] Peking must be downright attacked
and levelled to the ground [. . . ] Perhaps I shall appoint the supreme Gen-
eral with pleasure. Then, the course of actions must be grasped by one strong
hand, meaning a European one. [We will never allow the Russians and the
Japanese to solve the situation on their own and prevent us from taking part on
it.] German Minister will be avenged by my troops. Peking must be razed. . .
It is a struggle of Asia against the entire Europe!”74
On the same day, Wilhelm II ordered to mobilize an entire army
corps, yet Bülow opposed such a scheme. He persuaded Wilhelm II
to contend himself with a mobilization of a volunteer battalion and of
both battalions of marine infantry which were present in Europe. Nei-
ther the Reichstag, nor even the Chancellor Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-
Schillingsfürst were consulted.75 As far as the question of supreme
command was concerned, Foreign Secretary Bülow suggested wait-
ing until the antagonism between Franco-Russian and British-Japanese
blocks would emerge. As a compromise, the chief command should be
given to Germany. Wilhelm II strongly opposed: “This is definitely not
71 Ibidem, Nr. 4525, pp. 12–13, Kaiser Wilhelm II an Bülow, 18. 6. 1900.
72 Ibidem, Nr. 4526, pp. 13–14, Metternich an Bülow, 18. 6. 1900.
73 Ibidem, Nr. 4525, pp. 12–13, Kaiser Wilhelm II an Bülow, 18. 6. 1900.
74 Ibidem, Nr. 4527, p. 14, Kaiser Wilhelm II an Bülow, 19. 9. 1900.
75 MOMBAUER, p. 96. On 26 June was published Wilhelm II’s decision to send
1st and 2nd Battalion of marine infantry, an artillery battery, and a detachment of
engineers, under command of General von Hoepfner. GP, Bd. XVI, footnote  on
p. 24.
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the case! There must be no interest conflict, otherwise, the Europeans are sim-
ply lost!”76
For the time being, until the arrival of German reinforcements from
Europe, Germany had to rely on her troops which were already present
in the Far East. On 30 June 1900, Vice Admiral Bendemann received se-
cret instructions about the nature of German policy in China. Among
German goals were: protection of Europeans and their assets in China;
restoration of the status quo and obtaining sufficient guarantees from
the Chinese court; preventing of unnecessary acquisition of Chinese
territory by the powers or of creating further spheres of interest; main-
taining of the Open Door Policy. It was not advisable to support closer
affiliation of Japan to European powers. On the other hand, Bende-
mann was permitted to support any measure of political nature which
would enjoy both British and Russian support (this was an especially
secret point).77
When Wilhelm II started to rage about the alleged assassination of
his representative in China, Ketteler was still alive. It is a widespread
belief that those people who were by mistake considered dead will live
very long. Alas, it was not Ketteler’s case. German minister was well
known to the Chinese for his steadfast and brute attitude. “He was a
man of great courage but little finesse, who doubted the necessity or wisdom
of covering the iron fist with the velvet glove.”78 Examples of his approach
have already been presented; and the final one will be given.
Following the harsh foreign action at Dagu, the Chinese court held
several meetings, at which the xenophobic group gained the upper
hand. On 19 June at 4 p.m. the Zongli Yamen informed the hitherto
isolated foreigners in Beijing about the ultimatum given to the garrison
at Dagu on 16 June. The foreigners themselves were given a ultima-
tum ordering them to leave Beijing within 24 hours under protection
of governmental troops.79 The diplomats saw little point in resisting,
76 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4258, pp. 15–18, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 19. 9. 1900.
77 Ibidem, Nr. 4538, pp. 24–26, Bülow an Diederichs, 30. 6. 1900.
78 KEOWN-BOYD, p. 42.
79 This was hardly encouraging, for the foreigners in Beijing were already clashing
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and asked the Zongli Yamen for arranging a meeting on the next day
at 9 a.m. Most of the ministers were ready to comply with the Chinese
request; Ketteler strongly opposed. On 20 June at 8 a.m. the minis-
ters met together and waited on Chinese reply; by 9 a.m. no reply
came. Enraged Ketteler decided to visit the Zongli Yamen and explain
to Chinese princes in charge of Chinese diplomacy the wrongfulness
of their behaviour; he had already announced his visit in advance. His
colleagues tried in vain to dissuade him from undertaking such a risk,
stressing even the inappropriateness of waiting on the princes; but Ger-
man minister was adamant.80
Shortly after 9:30 a.m., Ketteler and his interpreter Heinrich Cordes
entered two sedan chairs, accompanied by two unarmed ceremonial
attendants. When they were passing by a checkpoint at the Hatamen
Street, a Bannerman named En Hai shot Ketteler into his head. Cordes
tried to escape, but En Hai shot on him as well. Hit in his legs, Cordes
managed to crawl into the nearby American Methodist mission, ob-
served, but not further harmed, by Chinese bystanders. En Hai stole
Ketteler’s silver watches. Both the Zongli Yamen and the foreign com-
munity were informed about the event immediately. German com-
mander von Soden with 20 marines rushed to the scene, but he didn’t
find traces of Ketteler or Cordes. Later that day Cordes and all the
Methodist missionaries and converts were evacuated to the relative
safety of foreign legations. Ketteler’s duties were assumed by his dep-
uty, Claus von Below. Shortly thereafter, the Zongli Yamen dispatched
two notes. The first note discouraged the foreigners from visiting the
Yamen, the second one, sent to the Germans, “demanded to know who
were the two Germans, one of whom had been killed, who had fired into the
with Chinese soldiers for several days.
80 “I will go there and I will be sitting there until they come, even if I had to wait the en-
tire night”, Ketteler explained. D. NOWAK, Der Tod des deutschen Gesandten
Clemens von Ketteler, in: M. LEUTNER – K. MÜHLHAHN (eds.), Kolonialkrieg
in China. Die Niederschlagung der Boxerbewegung 1900–1901, Berlin 2007, p. 112.
Moreover, Ketteler “felt that, having announced his visit, he must pay it”. R. HART,
“These from the land of Sinim.” Essays on the Chinese Question, London 1901, p. 19.
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crowd.No reply was sent to either of these cynical and insulting documents”.81
As a matter of irony, the news about factual Ketteler’s death reached
Europe only after 12 days, i. e. on 1 July,82 and the day after it was
finally confirmed.
Little is certain about the background of Ketteler’s death. After
the fall of Beijing, Ketteler’s murderer En Hai was captured by the
Japanese when he was trying to sell Ketteler’s watches. The Japanese
handed him over to the Germans; he has been interrogated repeatedly,
and he claimed that the troops had been ordered by some Manchu
prince to kill the foreigners. Since he knew neither Prince Duan nor
Prince Qing personally, he was unable to mark the culprit.83 Many for-
eigners were of the opinion that Ketteler’s murder was just a proof of a
plan to exterminate the entire foreign community in Beijing. As Henry
Keown-Boyd summarized it, “by his death he unwittingly saved the lives
of his diplomatic colleagues”.84
Other sources claim that Ketteler was specifically targeted by the
Chinese who hated him personally. Accordingly to Mr. Jamieson, a
member of British legation staff, “No other minister but the German would
have been murdered on his way to the Yamen that day. It was the firm ha-
tred towards him cherished by Li Peng Hêng, who fancied that he had been
deprived of the Governorship of Shantung owing to German representations
that proved fatal to Baron Ketteler.”85 In fact, Li Bingheng had just be-
gun his long journey to Beijing, and he didn’t owe his dismissal to
Ketteler personally. H. B. Morse quotes an unreliable source and sug-
gests that some officials wanted to have Ketteler’s corpse decapitated
and his head exhibited over a gate.86 Edmund Wehrle suggests that
81 KEOWN-BOYD, p. 92.
82 MORSE, pp. 247–248. Accordingly to a contemporary observer, young British
naval officer C.C. Dix, who took part on fighting in China, the foreigners in Tianjin
learned about Ketteler’s death already on 22 June. DIX, p. 66.
83 NOWAK, p. 115.
84 KEOWN-BOYD, p. 44.
85 WEHRLE, p. 176.
86 MORSE, footnote 125 on pp. 223–224.
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Ketteler’s death was a result of faction struggle at the Chinese court:
the war faction disliked a peaceful solution, therefore it arranged for
Ketteler’s murder.87
An opposite view is that Ketteler lost his life by chance. Dominik
Nowak discusses a theory of Xiang Lanxin which is based on the same
notes which Keown-Boyd plainly dismisses.88 Accordingly to this
theory, the German envoy was passing by the checkpoint and the near-
by Belgian legation. Ketteler’s revolver suddenly shot, the Chinese
thought to be under attack, and killed Ketteler. Foreign troops guard-
ing the Belgian legation repeated fire, and Cordes was wounded in a
crossfire. Later, En Hai allegedly found a revolver with five rounds
only inside Ketteler’s sedan chair. In reality, the Belgian legation had
been protected by Austro-Hungarian sailors. On 15 June, shortly af-
ter midnight, the “Boxers” attacked the Belgian legation and were re-
pelled by determined defence. On 16 June the entire legation staff
and its guards had left the isolated building. Austro-Hungarian sailors
were several times a day undertaking patrols towards the legation; yet
Austro-Hungarian officer Theodor von Winterhalder doesn’t mention
their presence at the scene of the fire.89 Any possibility of the crossfire
must be therefore dismissed.
Whatever the intentions of the Chinese court were, after Ketteler’s
death no foreigner did dare to leave the “safety” of the legation quarter.
On 20 June at 4 p.m. the fight against the foreigners in Beijing began.
Several thousands of Chinese converts, protected by about 40 French
and Italian troops, were isolated in the Beidang Cathedral. Most of the
foreigners, less than thousand people, were besieged in the legation
quarter. The diplomats had at their disposal little more than 410 troops
and several tens of armed volunteers; and they had to take care of hun-
dreds of foreign non-combatants and thousands of Chinese Christians.
The Germans were protecting their legation and part of the wall of the
87 WEHRLE, p. 176.
88 Xiang’s theory is summarized by Dominik Nowak. NOWAK, pp. 115–117.
89 WINTERHALDER, pp. 49, 203–204, and 212.
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Tartar City; to the west of them were the Americans. Both sides were
hiding behind barricades; at the walls of the Tartar city, the fighting
was especially fierce, and the barricades of both sides were very close
to each other.
At the beginning of the siege, things went wrong for detachments of
both German powers. In the morning of 22 June, German commander
was informed by an American messenger that the Americans had left
their position at the walls of the Tartar city. Fearing that the Chinese
would take advantage of this gap in the defence, Captain Thomann
ordered general retreat into the British legation. When the situation
became clear, the troops returned to their posts. Thereafter the com-
mittee of foreign representatives – unattended by both its German and
Austro-Hungarian members Below and Rosthorn – decided to recall
Captain Thomann from supreme command.90 Instead, the leadership
was entrusted to Sir Claude MacDonald, who had been an officer of
the 74th Regiment of the British army.91
How could the besieged foreigners be saved? The Germans con-
sidered a desperate suggestion by British consul at Tianjin Carles: to
threaten the destruction of Manchu ancestral tombs. Accordingly to a
report from 1 July, Wilhelm II didn’t consider it opportune; Vice Admi-
ral Bendemann had objections as well.92 British Prime Minister Lord
Salisbury was afraid of reaction of the British public opinion; too few
troops were available to undertake such an expedition; and a compro-
mise has been reached: the great powers stated that “all authorities at
Peking of whatever rank will be held responsible in person and property for
any act of violence against the Legations”. Germany agreed, and in the
first week of July the warning has been handed to Chinese minister to
London.93
90 Ibidem, pp. 234–238; KEOWN-BOYD, pp. 104–106; S. LESZKOVICH, Die Donau-
monarchie und der Boxeraufstand in China, Diplomarbeit, Wien 1991, pp. 33–34;
SCHUSTA, p. 84.
91 KEOWN-BOYD, p. 41.
92 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 5439, pp. 26–27.
93 YOUNG, pp. 143–145; GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4545, pp. 30–31, Richthofen an Bülow,
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Meanwhile, on 2 July 1900 reliable news about Ketteler’s factual
death finally reached the Emperor. Wilhelm II was preparing to speak
to the first German contingent of marine infantry which was about to
start the journey fromWilhelmshaven to the Far East. German emperor
explained: “Into the midst of the deepest peace – alas, not surprising to me –
the torch of war has been hurled [. . . ] The German flag has been insulted, and
the German Empire held up to scorn. This demands an exemplary punishment
and revenge.” The Emperor also reminded his troops of broader aspects
of their task: “Maintain a good comradeship with all the troops whom you
will join with there. Russians, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and whoever else –
they all fight for one cause, for civilization. Yet we also bear in mind some-
thing higher, our religion, and the defense and protection of our brothers over-
seas, some of whom have stood up for their Savior with their life.“94 On the
same day, Wilhelm II ordered to organize a brigade 7,000 men strong95
and composed of volunteers. Finally, German expeditionary corps con-
sisted of six infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, one artillery
regiment, and was commanded by General von Lessel.96 The expe-
ditionary corps consisted from about 520 officers and 11,000 soldiers.97
3. 7. 1900. Still, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Richthofen was of the
opinion that Germany could threaten the destruction of tombs unilaterally.
94 The text of the speech is available online at: The World War I Document
Archive, Kaiser Wilhelm II on German Interests in China, http://wwi.lib.
byu.edu/index.php/Kaiser_Wilhelm_II_on_German_Interests_in_China [2015-
10-08]. Accordingly to this website, the editors of the official version of the speech
deleted the sentence: “I hope [. . . ] to take revenge such as the world has never yet
seen.” The moderate variant of the speech is included in a contemporary edition
of Wilhelm II’s speeches, printed in 1904. L. ELKIND (ed.), The German Emperor’s
Speeches. Being a Selection from the Speeches, Edicts, Letters, and Telegrams of the
Emperor William II, London 1904, pp. 313–314.
95 MORSE, p. 266.
96 ZABEL, pp. 151–152.
97 Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg (further only “BArch-MA”), RM3/4745, Nr.
90. Betrifft Meldung überMassnahmen des Reichs-Marine-Amtes, welche die Ak-
tion in China betreffen. An Seine Majestät den Kaiser und König.
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Moreover, Germany sent the 1st division of battleships to East Asian
waters.98
Long mistrust of German Emperor towards China became justified.
In retaliation for Ketteler’s death, the Germans suggested not only the
aforementioned conquest of the forts at Qifu, but also seizing and sink-
ing of Chinese vessels at Yangtze. Fortunately, they didn’t have enough
naval forces in the Far Eastern area, thus neither of these measures was
adopted.99 The Chinese apologized almost immediately. On 3 July,
while the foreigners in Beijing were fighting for their lives again, the
Chinese court tried to start negotiations with foreign powers. The Chi-
nese adopted a different approach to each country: the British were re-
minded of the importance of their tradewith China, whereas the Amer-
icans were asked for mediation. The Chinese apologized to Germany
for Ketteler’s murder and promised to punish the culprits.100
In mid-July the Chinese court received a more palpable warning
than mere threats of responsibility. The international force defending
the foreign quarter of Tianjin was being steadily reinforced. Since 18
June there were about 600 German sailors present. On 19 June two
companies of the 3rd Battalion of German marine infantry, or, 265 men
under command of Major Christ, left Qingado, on 22 June they landed
at the mouth of the Peiho River and on the next day they entered
the foreign-controlled part of Tianjin.101 Among returning Seymour’s
troops were about 500 more Germans, about 450 of them able-bodied.
Ironically, while other countries were bringing reinforcements, the Ger-
mans started withdrawing their men from Zhili, out of concern for the
safety of Jiaozhou. As a result, the withdrawn German marine infantry
returned to Qingdao on 6 July 1900.102 On the same day there were
98 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4546, pp. 31–33, Bülow an das Auswärtige Amt, 3. 7. 1900;
ibidem, Nr. 4559, pp. 46–47, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 8. 7. 1900.
99 Ibidem, Nr. 4546, pp. 31–33, Bülow an das Auswärtige Amt, 3. 7. 1900.
100 MORSE, p. 248.
101 ZABEL, pp. 128–129; WINTERHALDER, p. 88.
102 WINTERHALDER, p. 93. The author quotes a Russian estimate of the overall
number of landed troops, including the legation guards – I have excluded these.
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about 17 100 foreign troops available in northern China; about 1100
of them German.103 On 13 July about 12,000 foreign troops104 started
an assault on the Chinese part of Tianjin. Russian and remaining Ger-
man troops were encircling the city from the east and north-east, forces
of other nations were attacking from the south, and the city fell on
14 July.105 Tianjin had already been plundered by the Chinese them-
selves, and the foreigners followed suit. “Some of the Russian, the French,
the Indian, and the German troops distinguished themselves as highway rob-
bers. . . it is certain that the three shortest of the Ten Commandments were
constantly violated on an excessive scale.”106 Shortly after the fall of Tian-
jin the Germans withdrew their remaining forces back to Qingdao.107
Most of xenophobes started changing their mind and Cixi ordered
to stop harassing the legation quarter in Beijing; this armistice lasted
until 29 July. At that time, Li Bingheng had finally arrived to Beijing.
He gained favour of Cixi, was appointed Generalissimo, like Ronglu,
and he urged renewing hostilities. Furthermore, he arranged execution
of five ministers who have proven their goodwill towards foreigners.
Among the executed was a distinguished diplomat Xu Jingcheng, who
had been representing China in Germany and other European coun-
tries several times since 1884. Despite the renewal of hostilities, foreign
diplomats in the legation quarter kept contact with the Zongli Yamen
until the arrival of international forces.
On the same day when Tianjin fell, other “news from Beijing”
reached Europe: On 8 July, the “Boxers” and Dong Fuxiang’s troops
had allegedly overrun the defences of the legations in Beijing and
Taking the context into the account I assume that the Russians didn’t count the
marine infantry in Qingdao.
103 Ibidem, p. 98. Winterhalder further quotes a telegram from 14 July by Japanese
General Fukushima. According to him, there were 13,500 foreign troops in Tianjin,
500 of them Germans. Ibidem, pp. 321–322.
104 MORSE, p. 264.
105 ZABEL, pp. 144–149; MORSE, p. 244; KEOWN-BOYD, pp. 134–143.
106 MORSE, p. 246.
107 ZABEL, pp. 155–156.
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slaughtered everyone. This news was attributed to a notable Chinese
enemy of the “Boxers”, namely Sheng Xuanhuai, who was in charge
of Chinese telegraphs. Sheng immediately denied any responsibility,
but the world didn’t care.108 Only after the Chinese court allowed
the besieged envoys to send ciphered telegrams to their capitals, the
people started to believe that the foreigners in Beijing still held on.109
Still, defeating the “Boxers” and punishing China was by no means
a single task. Various estimates of the number of foreign troops nec-
essary to capture Beijing ranged from 25,000 to 80,000, besides addi-
tional guards protecting their supply lines running through Dagu and
Tianjin.110 The most widely accepted opinion was that no less than
50,000 foreign troops would ensure the conquest of Beijing. The Ger-
mans were decided to participate on it; and they expected that they
would have enough time to reach the Far East in time.
German armed forces needed to transport large numbers of troops
to the Far East by sea. Since the voyage fromGermany to China around
the world was quite long, German government was looking for an-
other route. It seemed sensible to transport German troops through
Austria-Hungary to Trieste, and the Germans asked Austria-Hungary
for military access. On July 11, 1900, Austro-Hungarian emperor Fran-
cis Joseph I, who was at that time at his usual summer residence at
Bad Ischl, permitted German forces to pass through Austro-Hungarian
territory at will.111 On the next day, Count Bülow asked top-ranking
108 MORSE, pp. 248–249.
109 German telegram, dated 21 July, arrived to Tianjin on 29 July. Its text is quoted
in: T. WHITE – J. P. BOYD, The Story of China and Her Neighbours. Their Manners,
Customs, Life and History. Including the Boxer Uprising, Massacre of Foreigners and
Operations of the Allied Powers, [s. l.] 1900, p. 469.
110 MORSE, footnote 20 on pp. 264–265; POWELL, p. 114. The latter author claims
that the estimates ranged from 40,000 to 100,000, including rearguards. At the
same time, “by 13 July Admiral Seymour was calmly reporting that an advance by land
was not feasible ‘until after the rains say early September’”. YOUNG, p. 143.
111 Haus-, Hof- und Staaatsarchiv Wien (further only HHStA), Politisches Archiv
(further only PA) XXIX, China, Karton 14, Liasse Ia, Nr. 2167. Der Kaiser an
Sectionschef Graf Szécsen, Ischl 9. 7. 1900.
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representatives of the Army and the Navy whether or not would they
suggest such a move to German Emperor. They unanimously sup-
ported an urgent sending of further German forces to the Far East, but
preferred Bremerhaven to Triest. As a result, the idea of embarking
German troops at Trieste came to nought.112
Accordingly to the Emperor, the command in China was to be en-
trusted to one of the most prominent German soldiers. Count Alfred
vonWaldersee was a former chief of Prussian General Staff and he had
been in close touch with his Emperor for decades. It is a widespread
rumour that in April 1866, prior to the outbreak of the Prusso-Austrian
War, he arrived to Prague in order to gather military intelligence, only
to be arrested within a few days. In fact, Waldersee persuaded his el-
der brother to undertake that mission.113 He distinguished himself in
the Franco-German War, and later he closely collaborated with Hel-
muth von Moltke the Elder. Between 1888 and 1891, Waldersee was a
chief of the Great General Staff. After military manoeuvres of Septem-
ber 1890, Waldersee found himself somewhat estranged from Wilhelm
II, who dismissed him from that position and replaced him by Alfred
von Schlieffen. At the beginning of the Boxer crisis, Waldersee was a
Inspector-General of the Third Army in Hannover. On May 6, 1900,
he was promoted to the rank of Field Marshall.114 Waldersee had been
since the outbreak of the Boxer crisis informed about news from China,
and he was of the opinion that neither German nor foreign diplomats
did truly understand the situation in the Middle Kingdom. “Certainly,
112 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4564, p. 49, Bülow an Admiral Diederichs, 12. 7. 1900, and
footonote  on pp. 49–50.
113 Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee. Auf Veran-
lassung des Generalleutnants Georg Grafen von Waldersee bearbeitet und herausgegeben
von Heinrich Otto Meisner. Erster Band, 1832–1888, Stuttgart – Berlin 1922, pp. 24–
25.
114 Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee. Auf Veran-
lassung des Generalleutnants Georg Grafen von Waldersee bearbeitet und herausgegeben
von Heinrich Otto Meisner. Zweiter Band, 1888–1900, Stuttgart – Berlin 1922, p. 445.
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our Minister to Peking, Ketteler, informed us already six weeks ago that very
serious events were to be expected; but he has not been listened to.”115
On July 27, 1900, another part of German punitive expeditionary
corps left Bremerhaven. German emperor himself appeared in front of
his troops, accompanied by the Chancellor and State Secretary Bülow.
Emperor Wilhelm II was well known for his lack of reservation in
speech,116 and at this occasion he fully professed his contempt of the
Asians and his murderous grief over death of his minister to China
and over supposed slaughter of all Europeans in Beijing. In his famous
“Huns’ speech” (Hunnenrede)117 vengeful German Emperor expressed
his Christian bias and instructed his troops:
“But you can see from this what a culture not based on Christianity comes
to [. . . ] Well you know that you shall be fighting against a sly, brave, well-
armed, and cruel foe. When you come upon the enemy, smite him. Pardon
will not be given. Prisoners will not be taken. Whoever falls into your hands
is forfeit. Once, a thousand years ago, the Huns under their King Attila made
a name for themselves, one still potent in legend and tradition. May you in
this way make the name German remembered in China for a thousand years
so that no Chinaman will ever again dare to even squint at a German! Open
the way for civilization once and for all!”118
115 Denkwürdigkeiten, Zweiter Band, p. 447.
116 As Alfred von Waldersee remarked in May 1896: “He [the Emperor] frequently ex-
presses himself crudely in conversation, although later he often scarcely knows what he
said.” J. C.G. RÖHL, Wilhelm II. The Kaiser’s Personal Monarchy, 1888–1890, Cam-
bridge 2004, p. 712.
117 For wider context of the “Hun Speech”, see: B. SÖSEMANN, “Pardon wird nicht
gegeben!” Staatliche Zensur und Presseöffentlichkeit zur “Hunnenrede”, in: M.
LEUTNER – K. MÜHLHAHN (eds.), Kolonialkrieg in China. Die Niederschlagung
der Boxerbewegung 1900–1901, Berlin 2007, pp. 119–122.
118 TheWorldWar I Document Archive, Kaiser Wilhelm II on German Interests in China.
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Kaiser_Wilhelm_II_on_German_Interests_in
_China [2015-10-08]. H. B. Morse translated themost interesting sentences slightly
differently: “Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy.” MORSE, p. 309. Louis
Elkind presented an absolutely different translation of the crucial part of the
speech: “If you fall into his hands, then know that quarter will not be given, prisoners
will not be made [. . . ].” The reference to the Huns is omitted altogether. ELKIND,
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These sincere words didn’t fail to impress the audience. Both the
Chancellor and State Secretary Bülow asked the audience not to pub-
lish its most striking parts. The authorities published two censored
versions; yet it was inevitable that the full text of the speech gradually
leaked out.119 The impact of Wilhelm’s words was mixed. Inside Ger-
many, this speech aroused much criticism, but many Germans consid-
ered it a fitting response to atrocities of the Chinese. Outside Germany,
the audience was as shocked by alleged slaughter of all foreigners in
Beijing as Wilhelm II himself. German ambassador to France was told
by French Foreign Minister Delcassé that the speech “had made the best
impression throughout the whole of France”. From the technical point of
view, it was difficult to capture a “Boxer” alive. And both the Chinese
and foreign troops were habitually killing captured enemies.
The question of united command of the allied forces was a matter
of controversy among the great powers. The Russians were unwilling
to place their troops under command of a British, Japanese, or Amer-
ican officer, whereas the Japanese refused to submit their troops to a
Russian.120 Some of British statesmen didn’t recognize the need of a
supreme commander at all.121 It was a matter of German honour to
be in supreme command, and Wilhelm II wished to secure a universal
consent with Waldersee’s appointment. At the same time, he hesitated
to propose it on his own. Therefore he asked British government to
p. 315. In German, the most significant passage sounds: “Kommt Ihr vor den Feind,
so wird er geschlagen, Pardon wird nicht gegeben; Gefangene nicht gemacht. Wer Euch
in die Hände fällt, sei in Eurer Hand.” SÖSEMANN, p. 119.
119 SÖSEMANN, pp. 119–120.
120 MOMBAUER, p. 100; GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4548, pp. 34–36, Richthofen an Bülow,
4. 7. 1900.
121 Robert Cecil, Marquess of Salisbury, who at that time held the post of PrimeMinis-
ter and Secretary of State for ForeignAffairs simultaneously, was themost resolute
opponent of any joint command. On the other hand, already in late June Admi-
ral Seymour had suggested that “if a march on Peking becomes necessary there would
have to be one [his own emphasis] commander of the combined forces”. T. G.OTTE, The
China Question. Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905, Oxford 2007,
pp. 186–189.
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suggest Waldersee’s appointment, but the British failed to approve this
plan. Lord Salisbury had originally underestimated the “Boxer” cri-
sis,122 and he distrusted not only Russian, but also German intentions.
German chargé d’affaires in London, Baron Eckardstein, hinted in vain
that British refusal could force the Germans to cooperate with Russia
and France. Some of Salisbury’s colleagues from the British govern-
ment felt that he was too indecisive during the Chinese crisis, and ma-
jor changes in his government took place in November of the same year
– Salisbury himself transferred the Foreign Office to Marquess Lans-
downe.123 Wilhelm II’s Hun Speech of July 27 had further negative im-
pact on Lord Salisbury – but at that time, the Germans ceased counting
on British cooperation, and managed to gain support for Waldersee’s
appointment elsewhere.
On 6 August Wilhelm II turned to Russia, and the Tsar complied:
“I am happy to tell you that I fully agree to the nomination of Field-Marshall
Count Waldersee to that post [. . . ] With full confidence I place my troops
in Petchili [Zhili] under his command.”124 Thus, Nicholas II suggested
limiting Waldersee’s authority to the province of Zhili, while reserv-
ing Manchuria for Russia.125 On 7 August, German Emperor informed
Waldersee about his appointment.126 On 9August 1900 the British cabi-
net finally consented with German proposal. However, Lord Salisbury
succeeded in making the acceptance conditional. “If the other powers
placed their troops under the field marshal’s supreme direction,127 Britain
would follow their example.”128 On the next day, British Ambassador to
122 Ibidem, pp. 182–183.
123 Ibidem, p. 229.
124 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4602, p. 83, Kaiser Wilhelm II an Bülow, 6. 8. 1900; MORSE, p.
309. Tsar’s consent was announced by Germany on 7 August 1900.
125 A. MALOZEMOFF, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881–1904. With Special Emphasis on
the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1958, p. 131.
126 Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee. Auf Veran-
lassung des Generalleutnants Georg Grafen von Waldersee bearbeitet und herausgegeben
von Heinrich Otto Meisner. Dritter Band, 1900–1904, Stuttgart – Berlin 1923, p. 1.
127 Emphasis added by T.G. Otte – compare to footnote 129.
128 OTTE, p. 195.
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Germany Sir Frank Lascelles informed about British consent.129 Other
powers, including the French, approved Waldersee’s appointment. On
18 August 1900 Alfred von Waldersee accepted Field Marshall’s baton
from the hands of his Emperor at Kassel.130 He proceeded to Austria-
Hungary and Italy, and on August 23, he left Naples on board of a
steamer Sachsen.131 But at that time the fighting was already almost
over.
On 4 August German Ambassador to Russia reported that the Rus-
sians didn’t expect an advance on Beijing too soon.Subsequent Bülow’s
report supported this view.132 In fact, already on 4 August the al-
lied force left Tianjin and started its advance on Beijing. These force
totalled less than 20,000 men: 8,000 Japanese, 4,800 Russians, 3,000
British, 2,500 Americans, and 800 French, but no Germans.133 The Chi-
nese were unable to halt the advance of the international forces, and on
14 August 1900 the relief force finally seized Beijing and liberated the
legations.
Of course German forces weren’t idle. On 5 August 1900, two com-
panies of German troops under command of Captain-Lieutenant Phil-
ipp took part on an allied storming of Chinese position at Beicang.134
The lack of German participation on the advance on Beijing has been
caused partly by the assumption that the allied force would advance
only to Yangcun.135 On 9 August 1900, 200 German sailors led by
Captain Pohl joined forces with Austro-Hungarian and Italian detach-
ments, totalling 30 men each, and started their advance from Tianjin
129 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4607, p. 88, Lascelles an Derenthal, 10. 8. 1900. The text in
German edition uses the term “supreme command”, instead of “supreme direction”.
130 ELKIND, pp. 315–316; MORSE, footnote 108 on p. 311.
131 Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 5–8.
132 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4600, p. 80, Radolin an das Auswärtige Amt, 4. 8. 1900; ibidem,
Nr. 4601, pp. 81–82, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 5. 8. 1900.
133 MORSE, p. 268.
134 BArch-MA, RM2/1961, Nr. A. 6092 I, Berlin 8. 8. 1900.
135 Ibidem, Nr. A. 6094 I. Bendemann, Berlin 9. 8. 1900.
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to Beijing along the railroad. On the next day, Wilhelm II ordered all
available sailors to disembark and advance to Beijing.136
The Austro-Hungarians were delayed for some time, but all parts of
the expedition reached Yangcun on 11 August and guarded it for one
day against possible Chinese attack – even though Chinese forces had
been repeatedly defeated by the allied force, large hosts of the Chinese
continued fighting and disrupted rear of the foreign armies. On 12
August a new force of 100 Germans reached Pohl’s column. While the
allied armies were entering Beijing on 14 August, Pohl’s mixed force
reached the city of Madou, just in time to repel a Chinese attack on
American troops which were guarding the city. Only on 18 August
Pohl’s forces reached Beijing after a dangerous journey.137 Further 1,200
Germans entered Beijing on 23 August 1900.138
The fighting in Beijing was fierce until the last moment. In early Au-
gust, Yuxian’s troops from Shanxi reached the capital; and they were
well equipped and led by a resolute general. On 12 August the general
came to the barricades and encouraged his troops; and he was killed
by Mr. Bismarck, a German official of the maritime customs service
who had volunteered to defend the legations.139 The last of German
victims was killed on 14 August: a previously wounded soldier who
was killed one hour after his release from the hospital.140 During the
entire siege, German casualties were among the highest. Accordingly
to H. B. Morse, 13 Germans were killed and 16 wounded.141 Winter-
halder claims that 12 Germans were killed and 15wounded. The differ-
ence between these sources may be explained by the fact that Winter-
136 Ibidem, Nr. A. 6169 I. Berlin, 10. 8. 1900.
137 WINTERHALDER, pp. 417–418.
138 MORSE, p. 286. Morse claims that this was the first German force which entered
Beijing.
139 HART, p. 47.
140 Ibidem, p. 48.
141 MORSE, table on p. 280. Accordingly to this source, the overall number of killed
defenders was 76. 18 French were killed and 50 more wounded; the Italians
claimed 13 killed and 16 wounded as well, but their detachment was smaller.
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halder’s table does count civilian casualties separately.142 The Germans
had the highest death toll among all defenders of the legation quarter
itself. The number of casualties might have been even higher, but the
medical staff in the legation quarter spared no efforts. Among its most
praised members was doctor Welde from the German legation.143 On
21 September 1900 Wilhelm II awarded medals to all German defend-
ers of the legation quarter; Soden was awarded the highest military
order “Pour le Mérite”.144
After the fall of Beijing, the Empress Dowager, the Guangxu Em-
peror and numerous dignitaries fled the Forbidden City. They were
accompanied by Dong Fuxiang and his army; and finally they reached
the city of Xian in the province of Shaanxi, almost 1,000 km far from
Beijing. Ketteler’s murderer En Hai made a fatal mistake when he tried
to sale the silver watches he had stolen. Japanese troops captured him
and later handed him over to the Germans. EnHai’s defence was based
on the fact that he was merely following orders. The Germans were
unimpressed by such a defence and sentenced the murderer to death.
Ketteler’s body was found on 16 August in a coffin near the Hatamen
Street, unmutilated; soon thereafter it was buried with all honours.145
On 16 August, Beijing was divided into occupation zones of interven-
ing powers: Russia, the United Kingdom, France, USA, Japan, andGer-
many. The German zone was located in north-western part of the Chi-
nese City.146 The Forbidden City was not divided, but on 28 August a
friction of the allied forces paraded through this most sacred ground
in China. The Germans were less represented than some other nations.
800 Russians, 800 Japanese, 400 Americans, 400 British, 400 French, 250
Germans, 60 Austro-Hungarians, and 60 Italians participated on the
142 WINTERHALDER, p. 440.
143 HART, p. 43.
144 BArch-MA, RM3/4745, Nr. A. 7617 I. Wilhelm II, Berlin, 21. 9. 1900.
145 WINTERHALDER, p. 415; MORSE, p. 223.
146 WINTERHALDER, pp. 414–415.
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event.147 At that time the unrestricted rivalry among the great powers
started again.
On 26 August 1900, Russian Tsar announced his intention to with-
draw the bulk of his troops from Beijing. Even though the Germans
have been informed by Russian diplomacy in advance,148 this was a
blow to German interests.149 British cabinet refused to follow Russian
lead; the ministers were both unwilling to let German troops without
British counterweight, and willing to spare Germany the humiliation
of being deprived of command of an international army.150 German
objections were partly based on the obvious fact that the situation was
far from settled.151 Indeed, units of Chinese army and the “Boxers”
were dispersed, but not destroyed. There was still much fighting in
Zhili, in the vicinity of Tianjin as well as Beijing; and many foreigners
in other parts of China still felt threatened as well.
While the Germans contributed almost nothing to the relief of the
Beijing legations, they didn’t fail to react to a failure of British policy
at Shanghai. In August, the British decided to occupy the city in or-
der to protect it from possible Chinese attack. France and Japan fol-
lowed British example, and the Germans landed about 500 troops in
the city as well.152 Lord Salisbury didn’t consider German landing a
147 MORSE, p. 287; WINTERHALDER, p. 431.
148 GP, Bd. XVI, footnote  on p. 101.
149 The Russians claimed that it was not an anti-Germanmove; yet Bülow pointed out
that it was perceived as such not only abroad, but also by German public opinion.
GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4646, p. 134, Bülow an das Auswärtige Amt, 17. 9. 1900.
150 OTTE, pp. 198–199.
151 On 14 September 1900 German Ambassador to France Prince Münster informed
Berlin about his conversation with Russian Minister of Finance S. J. Witte. “By the
conquest of Beijing the situation changed, the resistance was broken,” claimed Witte. –
“Nonsense, the slaughter goes on with undiminished strength in western regions,” Ger-
man Emperor remarked. Nevertheless, he approved the following notion: “Good
relationship between Russia and Germany is worth more than entire China.” – “That may
be true.” GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4641, pp. 128–129, Münster an das Auswärtige Amt,
14. 9. 1900.
152 YOUNG, pp. 183–188; OTTE, p. 220.
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threat to British interests.153 On 27 August the new German Minister
to China Mumm von Schwarzenstein, en route to Beijing, appeared
in Shanghai and informed about German plan to send a war vessel
to Hankou.154 The British feared the possibility of German seizure of
forts at the Yangtze, yet in case of a serious clash between the Germans
and the Chinese they were ready to assist the Germans.155 Subsequent
construction of German barracks in the very heart of Shanghai soured
British attitude towards German troops in Shanghai.156 When the Chi-
nese asked German diplomacy to withdraw German forces, German
Minister to China suspected that the British have induced Chinese of-
ficials to make such a move.157 The Germans weren’t persuaded that
the conditions in China were already safe.158 Since August 1901, British
diplomacy tried to reach a simultaneous withdrawal of all occupying
forces.159 The British, French, Japanese, and German forces – totalling
2,000 to 3,000 soldiers each at the end160 – were withdrawn only af-
ter prolonged negotiations which were completed at the end of 1902.
German forces withdrew by 20 December 1902, most of them returned
to Germany, two detachments, 150 and 80 troops strong, were sent to
Jiaozhou and Tianjin, respectively.161
Aside from the question of Shanghai, the British and Germans gen-
erally cooperated. On 16 October 1900 the Germans and the British
concluded the so-called Yangtze Agreement which was aimed at main-
taining territorial status quo in China, as far as the two governments
153 GP, Bd, XVI, Nr. 4717, pp. 217–218, Richthofen an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 4. 7. 1900.
154 YOUNG, p. 191.
155 Ibidem, p. 192.
156 GP, Bd. XVI, footnote  on p. 451.
157 Ibidem, Nr. 4943, pp. 452–454, Mumm an Bülow, 9. 6. 1901.
158 Ibidem, Nr. 4944, p. 454, Mühlberg an Mumm, 9. 8. 1901.
159 Ibidem, Nr. 4945, pp. 455–456, Mumm an Bülow, 9. 6. 1901; ibidem, Nr. 4946, pp.
456–457, Mumm an Bülow, 21. 1. 1902.
160 MORSE, p. 365.
161 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4976, p. 491, Aufzeichnen des Staatssekretärs des Auswärtigen
Amtes Freiherrn von Richthofen, 7. 12. 1902; and footnote  on the same page.
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could exercise their influence.162 The spirit of Anglo-German cooper-
ation survived for some time, and for some time it seemed possible
(at least to the Germans) to create an alliance between Germany and
the United Kingdom, with possible participation of Japan. But the Ger-
mans were too eager to bind the United Kingdom to the Triple Alliance
formally, a move which the British resolutely opposed. Thus, the only
result of the negotiations became the conclusion of the British-Japanese
alliance on 31 January 1902. It is not necessary to present a detailed ac-
count of all these machinations, for it is already outside the scope of
this article.
The rivalry between the great powers spoiled Waldersee’s com-
mand. On 18 September the German commander reached Hongkong,
embarked on board of German armoured cruiser Hertha, and pro-
ceeded to the north. On 21 September he arrived to Shanghai and met
Minister Mumm; on 27 September he reached Tianjin. On 17 October
Waldersee entered Beijing and enjoyed a spectacular parade of the al-
lied forces inside theWinter Palace.163 In the same palace he also set up
his headquarters. Fedor von Rauch from Waldersee’s entourage listed
members of the staff. Waldersee’s staff was overwhelmingly German,
and this fact undoubtedly contributed to its efficiency. Aside from aux-
iliary personnel and of Waldersee himself there were 38 officers alto-
gether; with the exception of 8 foreign attachés all of them were Ger-
mans.164 There was one genuine Hun in Waldersee’s staff: Captain
von Etzel165 from the General Staff. Major General von Gayl held the
crucial post of Oberquartiermeister. Waldersee’s chief of staff was Major
162 Full text of the treaty is quoted by Kajima. M. KAJIMA, The Emergence of Japan as
a World Power, 1895–1925, Rutland – Tokyo 1969, pp. 91–92.
163 F. v. RAUCH,Mit Graf Waldersee in China. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, Berlin 1907, pp.
115–117.
164 RAUCH, pp. 14–16. Rauch lists 51 people altogether, but 12 of them were clerks
and surgeons and had no officer rank. Waldersee’s own memoires enumerate the
number of members of staff: 38 officers and clerks, 30 NCO’s and 146 soldiers.
Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, footnote 1 on p. 5.
165 “Etzel” means “Attila” in German.
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General Karl Julius Gross von Schwarzhoff. Colonel Yorck vonWarten-
burg was a noted historian. Among notable German commanders out-
side the staff of the allied forces was Major Erich von Falkenhayn, who
had been between 1899 and 1903 working as a military instructor to
Chinese army and later became one of the most notable German com-
manders during the First World War. On Waldersee’s request Falken-
hayn became German representative in the Tianjin Provisional Gov-
ernment, an autonomous body in charge of the city, composed from
foreign officers.166 General Lothar von Trotha led a brigade; four years
later he distinguished himself by slaughteringHerero rebels in German
Southwest Africa.
Directing an international force was an enormous problem. The
presence of large contingents from various countries led to frictions
and renewal of national animosity. Initially good relations between
Waldersee and French commanders have slightly worsened. Despite
this fact, the relationship between German and French soldiers was
generally good, much better than between the French and the British.167
Even during the closing phase of the campaign the Germans were of-
ten fraternizingwith unruly French troops.168 Waldersee enjoyedmuch
less respect than a “Weltmarschall” would deserve.169
After his arrival, Waldersee immediately found himself in the mid-
dle of a dispute between the Russians and the British. The Russians had
166 MORSE, p. 292.
167 Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, p. 45.
168 “In June [1901], a serious clash occurred over the closing of a brothel [in Tianjin]; over
200 of the French attacked with drawn swords and needle bayonets; a pitched battle ensued
with the British and Japanese on one side, the French and Germans on the other; about a
score were killed and wounded.” YOUNG, pp. 251–252.
169 “The French, Japanese and American generals stated that they had not received definite
orders to place themselves under the field-marshal’s command.” MORSE, footnote 113
on p. 312. “The French and Russians ignored him, the Japanese barely tolerated him,
the Americans thought him amusing.’’ YOUNG, p. 157. C. C. Dix had a much better
opinion of Waldersee: “For the rest of the operations he showed the greatest capacity
and tact, and did much not only to bring the campaign to a close, but to preserve at any
rate the semblance of a Peace between the Allies, who, immediately after the fighting was
over, began to quarrel among themselves.” DIX, p. 299.
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already seized railroads between Beijing and Manchurian border, run
by the British.170 A compromise has been reached: the control of the
track from Beijing to Yangcun was given toWaldersee, whereas the rest
to Shanhaiguan remained in Russian hands.171 Thereafter Waldersee
negotiated with the Russians about return of the railway from Yang-
cun to Shanhaiguan. The British disliked the terms of the treaty and
asked the German government to instruct Waldersee not to sign the
treaty until the British expressed their objections.172 British Ambas-
sador Lascelles stated that the situation was “exceedingly grave” and
could seriously damage British-German relationship. Bülow had his
doubts about the best course of actions, but he didn’t object to post-
poning of the signing of the treaty. Moreover he suggested that General
Schwarzhoff should sign the treaty instead of Waldersee.173 The treaty
has been signed on 17 January 1901. Another treaty from 15 Febru-
ary 1901 gave the control of the railway to British military authorities.
In accordance with Bülow’s suggestion, both treaties were signed by
Schwarzhoff.174
The inhabitants of Zhili cared little of such machinations of the for-
eigners; they were living under threat of foreign punitive expeditions.
H. B. Morse states that between 12 December 1900 and April 1901, 46
expeditions took place, 35 of them solely German, 4 Italian, 1 British,
1 American, the rest mixed.175 Fedor von Rauch lists 61 punitive expe-
ditions which took place at Waldersee’s command or were reported to
him. Rauch doesn’t enumerate those operations which had been con-
ducted prior to 29 September 1900. Accordingly to him, 40 of these
170 MORSE, p. 322.
171 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4757, pp. 261–262, Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Rats im
Auswärtigen Amt Klehmet, 11. 12. 1900.
172 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, (further only PA AA), R 17822,
Nr. 270, Berlin 5. 1. 1901.
173 Ibidem, Nr. 162, Berlin 6. 1. 1901.
174 German text of both treaties is quoted by Fedor von Rauch. RAUCH, pp. 421–424
and 425–430.
175 MORSE, p. 317.
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expeditions were German, 8 Italian, 3 Austro-Hungarian, 2 Japanese,
1 British, 1 American, and 6 mixed.176 Susanne Kuß states that 76 ex-
peditions took place in Zhili, 51 of them solely German. Moreover, the
Germans were involved in 29 cases of fighting with the Boxers or Chi-
nese soldiers.177
Such punitive expeditions were facilitated by attitude of many Chi-
nese commanders and officials. The most astute of Chinese statesmen,
Marquess Li Hongzhang, had for a long time been trying to negotiate
on China’s behalf. He tried to mitigate Wilhelm II’s wrath. In August
1900 he humbly asked Emperor Francis Joseph I for an intercession,178
but the aged Emperor refused to undertake any steps.179 On 1 Octo-
ber, Li re-assumed the duties of Viceroy of Zhili. At the same time,
he was appointed China’s negotiator during the peace talks, together
with Prince Qing. The attitude of Li Hongzhang towards foreign oc-
cupants of Zhili was rather compliant. He ordered Chinese garrisons
to retreat just before arrival of foreign troops.180 What was more im-
portant for the poor inhabitants of Zhili, Chinese governmental troops
turned against the “Boxers”.181 The exact number of Chinese victims of
the suppression of the Yihetuan movement will remain unknown, but
it is certain that tens of thousands of people lost their lives.
Only several punitive expeditions in Zhili will be summarized
shortly. On 11 September 1900, both Hoepfner’s battalions of marine
infantry, accompanied by Indian cavalry, surrounded and conquered
a small city of Liangxiang held by Chinese troops and the “Boxers”.
176 RAUCH, pp. 417–420 and 439–445.
177 S. KUß, Deutsche Strafexpeditionen im Boxerkrieg, in: M. LEUTNER – K.
MÜHLHAHN (eds.), Kolonialkrieg in China. Die Niederschlagung der Boxerbewegung
1900–1901, Berlin 2007, pp. 136–137.
178 HHStA, PA XXIX, China, Kt. 14, Liasse 1a, Nr. 6266, 20. 8. 1900.
179 SCHUSTA, footnote 198 on pp. 197–198.
180 MORSE, p. 318.
181 For example on 17 May 1901 Waldersee reported that a “Boxer” group had been
defeated by Chinese regular army. BArch-MA, RM2/1863, Telegram Nr. 231.
Waldersee, Peking 17. 5. 1901.
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Accordingly to Susanne Kuß, all adult males were summarily exe-
cuted, and the city was burned.182 Theodor von Winterhalder states
that 800 Chinese were killed during the fighting and 150 “Boxers” were
executed. Among the defenders were people who had taken part on
siege of the legations in Beijing.183 On 16–17 September 1900, a coor-
dinated punitive expedition of the allied forces took place to the west
of Beijing. H. B. Morse claims that its target was a city of Sanjiadian,
whereas Th. von Winterhalder states that the goal was a city of
Badazhu. Both authors are describing the same expedition. Accord-
ingly to Morse, three columns were supposed to surround the city,
but the German one didn’t appear, and so the Boxers fled.184 Winter-
halder states that the column in question, consisting of 1500 Germans,
100 Austro-Hungarians, and 170 Italians, arrived on time, but that the
Americans attacked too early.185 Among more notable cities occupied
by the Germans and other allied forces were Kalgan, an important city
on the border with Inner Mongolia, or Baojingfu, the capital of Zhili.
The greatest punitive expedition ever didn’t take place. In early
1901, Waldersee gradually formulated several different goals. In his re-
port from 12 January he evaluated the possibilities of expanding Ger-
man influence in Shandong. He didn’t consider necessary to seize the
port of Qifu. In case of speedy advancement of peace talks with China,
he suggested sending of 5,000–6,000 German troops from Zhili to Qing-
dao in order to enlarge German leased territory.186 Shortly thereafter
the situation changed. On 15 February 1901 Waldersee conversed with
Minister Mumm, who was disappointed by the conduct of the negotia-
tions with China.187 On the same dayWaldersee issued a general order
in which he suggested to renew hostilities on a large scale. Accordingly
to Waldersee’s plan, some 13,000 foreign troops should advance some
182 KUß, pp. 142–143.
183 WINTERHALDER, pp. 454–455.
184 MORSE, pp. 314–315.
185 WINTERHALDER, pp. 455–456.
186 Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 84–85.
187 Ibidem, p. 98.
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700 miles to the province of Shanxi in order to put pressure on the Chi-
nese court. Waldersee had consulted this idea with French commander
Voyron who had agreed. Even British commander Gaselee supported
the plan, but finally this idea has been rejected by the diplomats.188 On
28 March 1901 Waldersee reported to Chief of Staff Alfred von Schli-
effen that he had to abandon his plan; the most important reason was
that he had too few troops available. Basically, he could rely on 9,000
Germans, plus relatively few Austro-Hungarian and Italian troops.189
His plan was indeed hazardous, and it was widely criticised at Reich-
stag, even though some observers advocated it.190 Waldersee’s scheme
of enlarging German leased territory in Shandong came to nought as
well.
In China as well as at abroad, there were many complaints on be-
haviour of various armies, especially of the Germans. Already on 18
October anAmerican newspapers “NewYorkNation”wrote: “It is hard
to avoid the conclusion that the greatest single obstacle of peace is the intran-
sigeant attitude of Germany [. . . ] It is to Germany that the primacy belongs
in aggression and mischief-making.”191 But the Germans already had in
American eyes a rather undeserved reputation of being unenlightened
and aggressive.192 Indeed, Waldersee’s army had been suggested to be
aggressive. Alfred von Waldersee fully shared his Emperor’s attitude
towards China. On February 21, 1901, he wrote in a private letter: “Our
Kaiser was the only one who wanted to tackle the Chinese properly: if one had
followed him we would long have had peace.”193
Both Germany and China had been represented at the First Hague
Conference of 1899.194 Yet China did not ratify the 1899 “Convention
188 MORSE, pp. 343–344;Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, p. 98; YOUNG, pp. 247–249.
189 Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 116–118.
190 RAUCH, pp. 368–369.
191 MORSE, p. 319.
192 R. KAGAN,Nebezpecˇný národ. Zahranicˇní politika USA 1700-1900, Sv. I, Praha 2008,
pp. 324–325.
193 MOMBAUER, p. 95.
194 The list of Chinese representatives at the First Hague Conference is available in:
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with respect to the laws and customs of war on land” until 12 June
1907.195 Germany and many other great powers ratified this Conven-
tion on 4 September 1900,196 but their troops were behaving as if they
had never heard about any regulations at all. As a matter of irony,
Waldersee’s chief of staff General Schwarzhoff had been a technical ex-
pert of German delegation at the First Hague Conference of 1899. As
such, he had taken a special care of legal definition of combatants and
non-combatants.197 But his participation on the conference seemingly
had no impact on behaviour of international or German forces.
Not only the “Hun Speech”, but also “Hun letters” impressed mind
of Germans. Many German soldiers were disgusted by the enormous
bloodshed, and expressed their disgust by letters which they sent
home. These letters were widely exploited by the Socialists and their
leader August Bebel, and also by the Liberals. On 19–20 November
1900 a lively debate in Reichstag about China took place.198 Eugen
Richter (1836–1906), a distinguished Liberal statesman, criticised both
various aspects of the “Hun Speech” and the subsequent conduct of
German military:
“In general I mean: politics and religion shouldn’t be mixed together.
Should it happen, not only politics, but also religion will be spoiled. . . Un-
doubtedly, many Chinese have been captured; taking into the account the lim-
ited fighting ability of Chinese troops it should be admitted; but so far we
haven’t heard that Chinese prisoners had been anywhere taken into custody199
J. B. SCOTT (ed.), The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907. Accom-
panied by Tables of Signatures, Ratifications and Adhesions of the Various Powers and
Texts of Reservation, New York 1918, p. 8.
195 Ibidem, p. 130.
196 Ibidem, p. 129.
197 J. B. SCOTT, (ed.), The Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Oxford
1917, pp. 140–142.
198 U. WIELANDT, Die Reichstagsdebaten über den Boxerkrieg, in: M. LEUTNER –
K. MÜHLHAHN (eds.), Kolonialkrieg in China. Die Niederschlagung der Boxerbewe-
gung 1900–1901, Berlin 2007, pp. 165–172.
199 On 20 December 1900 Major Erich von Falkenhayn explained to the Tianjin Provi-
sional Government the fate of some captured and presumably innocent Chinese.
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[. . . ] Herr von Levetzow says: ‘I have experienced a war as well, and the
soldiers may have behaved in a similar way, too.’ That happens. But in the
previous wars, I believe, it didn’t happen that the supreme commander had
said in advance: ‘Pardon will not be given.’”200
Of course, some people defended Wilhelm II’s speech and actions
of German military. During the parliamentary debate Minister of War
said thatWilhelm II’s conduct was “from the human point of view, nice”.201
Rudolf Zabel argued in his book that German soldiers in conquered
cities weren’t encountering peaceful Chinese – truly peaceful Chinese
had already fled out of fear of the “Boxers”.
“Therefore, when a Boxer army retreats to such a city as Liangsianghsien
and holds a new position there, then we may assume that the few ‘peaceful
Chinese’ who remained in the city under such circumstances are to be consid-
ered to a certain degree accomplices of the Boxers. Even the Chinese knows
well: ‘Together captured, together hanged.’ So why did he stay there? [. . . ]
But the war generalizes.”202
Waldersee’s opinion of the Chinese was not entirely unfavourable.
German Field Marshall noticed that many Chinese settlements were as
clean as cities in Germany or France.203 He spotted Chinese frugality,
even though he wasn’t impressed by some of its aspects, like eating
cadavers.204 Meanwhile, Waldersee was experiencing the better part
of Chinese culture. A decade ago he had met a courtesan named Sai
Jinhua, who was at that time a concubine of Chinese minister to Berlin,
Hong Jun. When Alfred von Waldersee arrived to China, Sai Jinhua
introduced herself to him again. She gained some influence over him
“These prisoners had already been handed over. . . it was in contrary to German custom
to keep [emphasis mine] prisoners.” MORSE, p. 299.
200 Richter’s entire speech is available at a website dedicated to Richter’s memory:
Eugen-Richter-Archiv, Eugen Richter zur Hunnenrede Wilhelms II., http://www.
eugen-richter.de/Archiv/Reden/Reichstag_20_11_1900.html [2015-10-10].
201 SÖSEMANN, p. 120.
202 ZABEL, p. 382.
203 Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 85–86.
204 Ibidem, pp. 95–96.
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and presumably persuaded him to treat the Chinese less harshly. There
was even a suspicion that these two were in fact lovers.
The conditions in China were by no means good for the Germans.
Among notable victims of conditions in China were: Colonel Count
Yorck, who died on 27 November 1900 on a suffocation by carbon
monoxide,205 Captain Bartsch, “treacherously shot by a Beijing worker”,
and a notable military surgeon Prof. Kohlstock, who died of illness.206
Moreover Governor Jaeschke and Major Christ died in Qingdao at the
beginning of 1901 and 1902, respectively. At the night of 17/18 April
1901, large part of the Winter Palace was destroyed by a huge fire. The
fire originated in a house at the palace courtyard; Waldersee himself
had lived there and later he moved to a modern asbestos house nearby.
In the neighbouring house lived Major General Schwarzhoff who be-
came the only victim of the fire. At its beginning Schwarzhoff was
absent, walking in the neighbourhood, but then he returned and man-
aged to save some of the most important documents which he kept at
his flat. Thereafter he wanted to save his dog which was sleeping un-
der his desk; and he disappeared. His corpse has been found the next
day. Schwarzhoff’s burial took place on 20 April.207
At that time, the withdrawal of the allied forces has already been
underway. On 28 March Waldersee expressed fear that the German ex-
peditionary force could be drawn into British-Russian hostility. More-
over he was afraid of spread of infectious diseases among the troops.
From these reasons he suggested withdrawal of the Germans from
China.208 On 6 April 1901 Field Marshall Waldersee proposed partial
retreat of foreign contingents.209 At that time there were still tens of
thousands of foreign troops in Zhili.210 On 3 June 1901 German Field
205 RAUCH, p. 174; Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, p. 62.
206 RAUCH, pp. 325–326.
207 Ibidem, pp. 324//345; Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 126–129.
208 Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 114–116. Waldersee’s report from 28 March
1901.
209 YOUNG, pp. 253–255.
210 Ibidem, p. 253. Young claims that no less than 60,000 troops were present in
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Marshall himself left China for good. He arrived to Hamburg at the
beginning of August; on 12 August he met the Emperor in Homburg;
and he returned to his post of Inspector-General of the Third Army.211
Similarly, the allied forces were gradually withdrawing from Zhili. In
July 1906 there were still more than 5,000 foreign soldiers, excluding
the legation guards; 450 of them were German.212
At that time, the negotiations between China and the foreign pow-
ers which had started in December 1900 were still underway. Gener-
ally speaking, throughout the entire negotiations the Germans enjoyed
support of their allies from the Triple Alliance, i. e. Austria-Hungary
and Italy. Among the most controversial questions was the fate of the
noblest culprits. The Germans continuously insisted on punishment of
the worst criminals, including prince Duan himself.213 Finally, Duan’s
life was spared, but Duan was deprived of his ranks and banished, and
his son Pujun lost the position of heir-apparent. After prolonged nego-
tiations, the “Boxer Protocol” has been signed on 7 September 1901.214
It assured satisfaction for the murder of Minister Ketteler. China had to
send a prince as a special envoy to Berlin, and a marble arch had to be
erected at the place where Ketteler had lost his life. China agreed to pay
an enormous indemnity: 450 million taels (67.5 million pounds), plus
interests. Throughout the negotiations the Germans claimed 91,287,043
taels, and they were ascribed 90,070,515 taels, or 20 % of the enormous
sum. China had to repay this sum in instalments until 1940. The lega-
tion quarter had to be rebuilt, fortified, and garrisoned by a standing
force of legation guards. The area of the German legation had grown
Zhili at that time. Some of his figures are inflated: he states that 17,800 French
and 18,700 Germans were present, whereas Morse estimates that there were some
44,000 foreign troops at the end of 1900, 9,000 to 11,000 of them being German.
MORSE, pp. 319–320.
211 Denkwürdigkeiten, Dritter Band, pp. 170–171.
212 YOUNG, footnote 2 on p. 255.
213 GP, Bd. XVI, Nr. 4643, pp. 130–132, Bülow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, 15. 9. 1900.
214 The terms of the Boxer Protocol are analyzed in: MORSE, pp. 347–359.
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ten times: from 2.5 to 25.5 acres.215 Germanywas allowed to station 300
legation guards in Beijing, together with 5–6 cannons and 6 machine
guns. Furthermore, foreign forces gained the right to occupy various
points at the way between Beijing and the sea, whereas Chinese forti-
fications in the area were destroyed. Weapons import to China in the
next two years was forbidden. Among other provisions of the treaty
were: punishment of high-ranking culprits and posthumous rehabili-
tation of moderate ministers, or capital punishment for membership in
anti-foreign societies.
At the time of the signing of the Boxer Protocol, the penitentiary
mission had already arrived to Germany. On 12 July 1901216 Chinese
court sent to Germany a special envoy, Zaifeng, Prince Qun, who was
a brother of the powerless Guangxu Emperor and a future father of the
last Chinese Emperor Puyi.217 Prince Qun was requested to perform
the ritual of kowtow in front of the German Emperor, but he refused
to do so. On 4 September 1901 he was granted an audience at Pots-
dam and apologized for Ketteler’s murder. Wilhelm II replied in a
conciliatory manner, even though he remained adamant as far as the
punishment of guilty Chinese was concerned.218 German Emperor be-
lieved in cooperation between foreign powers and China, and the Em-
press Dowager Cixi shared this attitude. On 7 January 1902, Chinese
Imperial court returned to Beijing. The entire diplomatic corps was in-
vited to observe its return. On 24 January 1902, the Empress Dowager
and the Guangxu Emperor granted an audience to foreign represen-
tatives in Beijing.219 At this occasion, those diplomats, who had been
appointed only after the defeat of the Boxer Uprising, presented their
215 Ibidem, pp. 355–356.
216 Ibidem, p. 348.
217 K. MÜHLHAHN, Kotau vor dem deutschen Kaiser? Die Sühnemission des
Prinzen Chun, in: M. LEUTNER – K. MÜHLHAHN (eds.), Kolonialkrieg in China.
Die Niederschlagung der Boxerbewegung 1900–1901, Berlin 2007, pp. 204–209.
218 Wilhelm II’s speech to Prince Qun is recorded in: ELKIND, pp. 316–317.
219 HHStA, PA XXIX, China, Kt. 7, Berichte 1902, Nr. 3/Vertraulich, Czikann an
Gołuchowski, Peking 25. 1. 1902.
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credentials; as the first of them, Minister Mumm, the others followed.
It was clear that the Boxer Uprising was over; but the dynasty was al-
most over as well.
Abstract
In late 1890’s, a xenophobic Yihetuan (“Boxer”) movement emerged in German
sphere of influence in Shandong. In 1900, the movement spread into the neighbour-
ing province of Zhili andwas largely tolerated by anti-foreign officials. Foreign diplo-
mats failed to understand this threat. As a consequence of hasty and miscalculated
moves of both sides, the Chinese court found itself in the middle of an open conflict
with the great powers. Since mid-June, foreign detachments were fighting with gov-
ernmental troops in Zhili; on June 20, German Minister to China was killed and the
siege of the Beijing legations began. German forces in the Far East were too limited
to participate much on the fighting. Germany sent a large expeditionary force to the
Far East, but these troops arrived too late to take part on the conquest of Beijing on
14 August 1900. Allied forces under supreme command of German Field Marshall
Alfred vonWaldersee occupied Zhili and conducted many punitive operations at the
country. During the crisis, Germany gained bad reputation for the conduct of her
troops.
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